[Printed  by  authority  oLthe  State  of  Illinois.] 


Circular. 


GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS, 
STATE  OP  ILLINOIS, 

The  Adjutant  General’s  Office, 
^  October  21i  1915, 


The  following  reprint  is  made  for  the  use  of  Officers  of  the 
National  Guard  of  Illinois  in  connection  with  work  in  Army 
Instructions.  ' 

P.  S.  Dickson,  The  Adjutant  General, 


^  DUTIES  OP  INPANTRY  OPPICERS  AND  NONCOMMISSIONED 
OPPICERS  IN  EXTENDED  ORDER  AND  COMBAT 

EXERCISES. 

Corporals:  Read  6b  I.  D.  R.,  last  paragraph  I.  D.  R.  22,  42, 
'  43,  75,  98,  last  of  103,  124,  125,  126,  127,  133  to  143,  146  to  158 
(see  changes).  Note  that  the  Corporal,  School  of  the  Company, 
is  in  the  middle  of  the  squad;  School  of  the  Squad  (acting  alone) 
he  is  either  in  front  or  behind  his  squad,  but  the  Corporal  during 
firing,  either  when  the  squad  is  acting  alone  or  in  company,  is 
all  over  the  squad. 

The  Corporal  is  now  the  real  commander,  placing  himself 
where  he  is  capable  of  handling  all  his  men,  correcting  their 
faulty  sight  setting,  their  aiming,  their  use  of  ammunition,  their 
use  of  cover,  keeping  them  calm  and  intent  upon  the  proper  per- 
formance  of  their  functions,  using  the  rifle  with  all  the  care  and 
precautions  for  effectiveness  and  safety  as  are  used  in  range 
practice,  seeing  that  they  advance  always  a^  the  command.  Are 
I  carefully  at  the  proper  target,  and  use  their  ammunition  for  its 
1  fullest  value.  It  matters  little  whether  the  .Corporal  use  his  own 

I  rifle  at  all.  I  think  it  best  in  the  National  Guard  that  the  Cor¬ 

poral  should  NOT  use  his  rifle  for  firing,  but  devote  all  his  time 
and  energy  to  the  active  command  of  his  men;  it  is  best  unless 
his  men  are  unusually  well  trained  and  experienced  in  war,  and 
even  then  he  will  have  all  the  work  he  can  do  without  firing  at 
all. 

I  All  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  should  under¬ 
stand  that  the  handling  of  the  rifle  by  the  private  is  in 

'  accordance  with  the  firing  regulations:  the  sighting,  the 

position,  the  aiming,  the  trigger  squeeze,  the  sight-setting  above 

iall  things,  the  elevation  and  deflection  corrections,  the  use  of 
the  sling,  the  use  of  the  lock,  penalizing  the  excessive  use  of 
ammunition,  attention  to  the  Tvhistle  and  oral  command;  these 
things  the  Corporal  MUST  attend  to,  and  he  must  in  addition 
|j|  watch  the  enemy,  watch  the  superior  noncommissioned  officers 

I  and  officers  who  immediately  command  him  and  study  the  ground 

I  so  as  to  utilize  its  advantages  and  avoid  its  disadvantages.  As 
I  the  Corporal  works,  keeping  his  men  calm  and  attentive  to  the 
I  performance  of  their  duty,  correcting  their  errors  and  omissions, 
so  will  the  efficiency  of  the  company  be.  It  follows  then  that  a 
Corporal  must  be  not  only  superior  in  intelligence,  loyalty  and 


2 


obedience,  but  letter  perfect  in  the  Drill  Regulations  and  the 
Firing  Manual,  and  no  amount  of  careful,  painstaking  instruc¬ 
tion  in  these  things  will  be  wasted.  Sergeants,  under  the  new 
order,  would  be  better  off  if  not  armed  with  the  rifle,  except  for 
the  detached  action  which  they  are  constantly  required  to  super¬ 
vise  and  for  use  in  the  bayonet  encounter.  Whenever  any  officer 
or  noncommissioned  officer  begins  to  fire  in  battle,  his  attention 
becomes  wholly  absorbed  in  his  own  firing  and  he  becomes 
wholly  oblivious  to  what  is  happening  around  him  and  while  he 
may  be  firing  effectively  himself,  the  whole  of  his  proper  com¬ 
mand  may  be  wasting  its  efforts  and  ammunition.  A  sergeant 
should  never  fire  when  with  the  company,  and  in  detached  action 
should  restrict  the  use  of  his  rifle  practically  to  self  defense. 
Until  troops  are  thoroughly  trained  and  in  excellent  discipline, 
it  will  always  be  preferable  that  the  corporals  do  not  fire.  If 
they  use  all  their  time  for  coaching,  instructing  and  advising,  the 
time  may  come  when  the  men  will  be  so  thoroughly  habituated- 
to  the  proper  use  of  the  rifle  that  they  no  longer  require  close ' 
supervision  and  the  corporal  may  then  fire.  It  is  true  that  with 
the  noncommissioned  officers  not  firing,  the  company  loses  the 
fire  effect  of  some  of  its  best  shots,  but  the  army  loses  the  battle 
firing  of  its  best  shots  with  the  commissioned  officers,  for,  if  we 
examine  the  composition  of  the  rifle  teams  in  the  late  National 
Competitions,  we  find  that  nearly  the  whole  of  National  Guard 
teams  were  commissioned  officers  and  fifty  per  cent  of  the 
Infantry,  Cavalry,  Navy  and  Marine  Corps  teams  were  com¬ 
missioned  officers.  Note  also  that  the  Regular  Army  in  the 
Department  Competitions  had  to  rule  commissioned  officers  out 
of  the  competitions  and  in  place  of  active  participation,  allowed 
to  them  medals  equal  to  that  of  any  enlisted  competitor  when 
the  officers’s  score  exceeded  that  of  the  enlisted  medal  winner 
by  five  per  cent.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  note  the  dffect  of  fire 
of  excellent  shots  at  ranges  beyond  those  in  which  the  danger 
space  is  continuous  and  when  the  estimation  of  range  is 
erroneous  (Balck,  I,  p.  168  et  seq).  Note  also,  that  in  the  war 
strength  Infantry  company,  there  are  eighteen  noncommissioned 
officers  who  might  fire  and  eighty-four  privates  -  (including 
artificer)  who  should  fire,  twelve  squads  with  a  corporal  or  lance 
corporal  for  each.  The  corporal  should  be  an  adept  in  the  use 
of  motions  and  signals,  for  though  the  sergeants  and  com¬ 
missioned  officers  are  supplied  with  whistles,  the  corporals  are 
not  and  even  if  they  were,  the  whistle  is  good  only  for  calling  at¬ 
tention  to  a  signal  which  follows  it  and  the  corporal  is  close  enough 
to  all  his  men  to  immediately  indicate  his  will,  but  he  can  not 
expect  to  do  so  by  voice  during  firing,  likewise  he  must  under¬ 
stand  the  signals  of  his  superiors,  not  only  those  of  the  drill 
regulations,  but  those  which  will  be  devised  as  circumstances 
require. 

It  is  advisable  in  extended  order  in  peace  training,  that  the 
corporal  give  no  oral  commands  except  “follow  me”  and  use 
the  prescribed  signals  for  all  others;  this  for  two  reasons:  first, 
that  the  men  become  accustomed  to  the  signals;  second,  watch¬ 
ing  for  signals  requires  closer  attention. 


Sergeants:  What  applies  to  the  Corporal  applies  also  to 
the  Sergeant.  The  Sergeant  must  see  that  the  Corporal  does 
his  duty  but  must  also  he  prepared  to  assist  the  Corporal  in 
maintaining  control  of  his  m^en,  particularly  so  where  any  reen¬ 
forcement  has  taken  place  or  otherwise  where  the  men  of  dif¬ 
ferent  units  have  become  intermingled.  It  is  at  such  occasions 
that  disorder  is  created  and  control  destroyed.  Sergeants  and 
Platoon  Leaders  must  be  ready  for  this  and  take  immediate 
action  assigning  new  men  to  squads,  seeing  particularly  that  the 
new  men  obey  the  corporals  to  whose  command  they  may  be 
assigned,  and  likewise  seeing  that  men  of  their  own  company 
obey  the  orders  of  a  corporal  from  another  company  v/hen  like 
circumstances  make  his  assignment  to  the  command  of  that  cor¬ 
poral  desirable  or  necessary.  The  tactics  of  Infantry  require 
that  in  battle  each  Infantry  Officer  and  soldier  place  himself 
under  the  authority  of  the  nearest  Infantry  Commander.  By 
analogy,  it  is  the  duty  of  an  Infantry  leader  or  commander  to 
assume  command  of  those  nearest  him  without  regard  to  com¬ 
pany,  battalion  or  regiment,  and  to  forego,  in  battle,  the  com¬ 
mand  of  those  whom,  by  virtue  of  his  regiment  and  company 
assignment,  he  is  normally  entitled  to  command  but  who  have 
become  separated  from  him  in  the  incidents  of  battle.  I  abjure 
all  infantry  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  to  observe 
these  things  for  they  are  incidents  to  the  crisis  of  battle  and  at 
the  time  v/hen  control  is  most  vital  and  ordinarily  least  effective. 

Many  of  the  Sergeants  will  be  utilized  as  Platoon  Com¬ 
manders.  Those  who  are  not  utilized  as  Chiefs  of  Platoons  are 
assistants  to  Chiefs  of  Platoons  and  will  assist  platoon  com¬ 
manders  whether  directed  to  do  so  or  not.  Just  as  a  file  closer 
in  close  order  has  the  normal  function  of  correcting  errors  and 
insuring  steady  marching  and  accurate  drill,  so  a  Sergeant  who 
has  no  platoon  to  command  in  extended  order  has  the  duty  of 
preserving  the  calm,  steady  and  accurate  execution  of  battle 
orders  and  should  observe  and  report  all  matters  which  he  has 
no  authority  to  control.  In  the  main,  the  duties  of  such  sergeants 
will  be  those  of  platoon  commanders  under  the  control  and 
direction  of  platoon  commanders.  They  are  also  available  for 
detached  action  and  may  be  advantageously  used  in  the  obser¬ 
vation  of  fire  and  possibly  as  range  finders. 

Chiefs  of  Platoons:  The  Drill  Regulations  fix  twenty-five 
men  as  the  limit  which  one  person  can  control  by  voice  in  action, 
hence  the  company  is  divided  into  platoons  so  that  there  shall 
be  two  to  four  squads  each,  preferably  three,  but  never  more  than 
four;  to  the  command  of  these,  the  Lieutenants  and  Sergeants 
are  assigned  in  order  of  rank,  but  a  vacancy  created  by  casualty 
in  battle  would  be  filled  by  seniority  in  the  platoon  or  by  assign¬ 
ment  of  the  captain  pending  the  termination  of  the  engagement, 
without  change  in  the  command  of  other  platoons. 

In  peace  strength  companies,  and  particularly  in  those  in 
which  discipline  and  training  is  not  yet  at  its  greatest  efficiency, 
I  think  it  advisable  to  make  platoons  of  two  squads,  normally, 
both  for  better  instruction,  and  in  order  to  give  sergeants  an 
opportunity  for  practice  of  their  legitimate  functions. 


4 


The  Drill  Regulations  prescribe  that  the  platoon  commander 
has  a  post  five  paces  in  rear  of  the  center  of  his  platoon.  While 
observing  the  action  of  the  whole  platoon,  this  is  a  good  place 
to  be  and  the  voice  should  carry  to  both  ends  of  the  platoon  ex¬ 
cept  during  moderate  firing;  but  an  active  platoon  commander 
is  on  the  line,  in  the  line,  at  both  ends,  and  at  all  parts,  always 
coaching  and  directing.  In  advances  he  leads,  he  is  the  first 
file  in  platoon  column  and  ahead  of  the  line  in  rushes  and, 
when  he  halts  or  drops  to  cover,  the  platoon  halts  and  drops  to 
cover  in  line  with  him.  The  most  important  function  of  the 
Chief  of  Platoon  is  Fire  Control.  All  officers  and  all  sergeants 
should  be  thoroughly  conversant  with  the  provisions  of  Part  III, 
Small  Arms  Firing  Manual,  at  least  the  first  three  chapters, 
likewise  in  the  Drill  Regulations  the  following:  School  of  the 
Company,  paragraphs  199  to  257,  290  to  326  and  Part  II.  This 
paper  is  not  intended  to  take  the  place  of  such  very  necessary 
study,  but  only  in  amplification  of  it.  The  main  duty  of  the  Chief 
of  Platoon  as  stated  is  fire  control  and  consequently  fire  dis¬ 
cipline;  a  certain  target  is  assigned  to  him  and  it  is  his  duty  to 
so  direct  the  fire  of  his  platoon  upon  that  target  as  to  overcome 
the  resistance  of  the  troops  composing  that  target;  when  to 
fire  and  when  not  to  fire,  the  intensity  of  the  fire,  when  to  in¬ 
crease  or  diminish  the  rate  of  fire,  the  determination  and  chang¬ 
ing  of  range,  the  determination  of  the  effect  of  the  fire  of  his 
platoon,  the  determination  as  to  the  possibility  of  advancing 
and  the  manner  in  which  that  advance  can  be  made;  all  these 
are  functions  of  the  platoon  commander  as  well  as  the  super¬ 
vision  of  the  corporals  and  the  work  and  control  of  the 
squads.  While  the  Drill  Regulations  and  References  indicate 
that  a  platoon  is  the  largest  body  that  can  be  directly  controlled 
by  voice,  in  practice  such  control  will  be  found  difficult,  hence 
the  Chief  of  Platoon  is  provided  with  an  efficient  whistle,  one 
short  blast  of  which  calls  attention  of  the  corporals  to  the  signal 
which  is  about  to  be  given,  and  troops  should  be  trained  in  the 
conventional  signals  coincidentally  with  their  general  training 
in  battle  formations  and  technique.  See  I.  D.  R.  234.  The  Cap¬ 
tain  will  from  time  to  time,  as  he  sees  proper,  assemble  the 
range  finders  and  correct  the  ranges  given;  he  will  also  as 
occasion  demands,  change  the  assignment  of  target  and  other¬ 
wise  direct  the  action  of  platoons  in  accordance  with  conditions. 

The  Company  Commander:  The  direction  and  control  of  the 
company  as  a  whole  lies  in  the  Captain  who  operates  through 
the  Platoon  and  Squad  leaders,  using  the  best  estimators,  re¬ 
gardless  of  rank,  as  Range  Finders  and  the  Musicians  as  messen¬ 
gers  and  as  prescribed  in  235  I.  D.  R.  The  Captain  points  out 
or  describes  the  general  target  for  the  company  and  the  target 
for  each  platoon,  making  sure  that  the  location  is  accurately 
determined  and  understood.  In  considering  paragraph  247,  I. 
D.  R.,  one  must  have  in  mind  the  effect  of  windage  and  a  keen 
appreciation  of  the  refaction  of  the  line  of  sight  to  the  line  of  fire, 
for  it  is  evident  that  if  a  target  at  1,000  yards  is  hit  with  sights 
directed  upon  it  and  elevation  of  1,050  yards,  the  elevation  must 
be  less  to  hit  the  same  target  if  an  object  200  yards  further  is 


t 


used  as  an  aiming  point,  though  mathematical  computation  will 
not  take  the  place  of  the  observation  of  fire  effect. 

In  general,  the  Captain  supervises  and  directs  all  the  advance 
of  the  company.  This  does  not,  however,  prevent  the  advance 
of  a  subdivision  in  accordance  with  what  is  the  known  will 
of  the  Captain — that  is,  if  it  is  known  that  the  Captain  desires 
the  company  to  advance  as  it  may  be  possible,  and  it  is  im¬ 
practicable  for  the  company  as  a  whole  to  advance  but  a  platoon 
commander  finds  that  his  platoon  can  make  an  advantageous 
rush  so  as  to  act  as  a  key  or  base  unit  for  the  company,  it  is 
quite  permissible  and  desirable  that  such  rush  be  made. 

The  Major:  Prior  to  formation  for  battle,  the  Major  determ¬ 
ines  what,  if  any,  additional  ammunition  is  to  be  used,  what 
companies  shall  compose  the  firing  line,  support  and  reserve, 
determines  the  order  of  the  companies  in  line,  points  out  the 
target,  subdivides  it  so  that  each  company  has  a  definite  target 
or  objective,  states  the  relations  of  neighboring  troops,  if  there 
be  any,  gives  the  end  to  be  attained  by  the  action,  states  the 
front  of  companies  in  the  firing  line — that  is,  determines  and 
orders  the  intervals  between  skirmishers — states  the  conditions 
of  the  enemy  so  far  as  known.  He  v/ill  also  provide  for  flank 
protection  if  the  battalion  be  operating  alone  or  with  an  exposed 
flank.  This,  however,  does  not  relieve  the  Captain  of  a  flank 
company  of  the  duty  of  either  providing  his  own  flank  protection 
or  furnishing  connection  with  the  flanking  groups  provided  by 
the  Major.  Correct  tactics  do  not  permit  any  officer  to  depend 
wholly  upon  another  to  protect  him  against  surprise  when  he 
can  see  for  himself  that  his  flank  is  unprotected  or  can  not  see 
that  it  is  protected.  The  Major  indicates  when  the  fire  fight 
shall  begin  but  does  not  necessarily  do  this  before  the  deploy¬ 
ment  of  the  battalion;  in  fact,  it  is  preferable  that  he  withhold 
this  decision  until  the  advance  makes  the  hostile  condition  ap¬ 
parent — that  is  to  say,  that  in  the  attack  particularly,  the  time 
for  deployment  of  the  battalion  into  its  company  combat  units 
will  usually  be  at  such  distance  from  the  enemy  that  his  strength 
and  vigor  can  not  be  so  well  determined  as  to  fix  the  time  for 
the  beginning  of  the  fire  action.  The  rule  is  that  where  su¬ 
premacy  is  sought,  the  least  distance  at  which  fire  may  be 
opened  upon  an  enemy,  either  in  attack  or  defense,  the  more 
effective  and  decisive  will  that  fire  action  be,  particularly  if  it 
can  be  brought  to  bear  suddenly  and  in  great  volume.  This  is 
always  true  in  the  attack;  on  the  defense,  the  reason  for  taking 
the  defensive  may  be  recognized  inability  to  overcome  and  pur¬ 
sue  the  enemy  or  the  orders  may  require  that  the  attacking 
enemy  be  stopped  or  delayed,  hence  while  we  have  but  the  one 
rule  for  the  attack,  that  of  withholding  fire  until  arrival  within 
effective  ranges,  the  battle  conditions  of  the  defense  may  re¬ 
quire  either  that  they  hold  or  delay  the  attacker  by  fire  at  the 
longer  ranges,  or,  for  the  purpose  of  greater  damage  and  more 
certainty  of  success  in  the  counter  attack,  that  they  withhold 
their  fire  until  reasonably  certain  that  the  range  is  such  that 
they  can  suddenly  overpower  and  disorganize  the  attacker  by  a 


6 


burst  of  well-directed  fire  followed  up  by  a  vigorous  counterat¬ 
tack.  Ammunition  supply  always  governs  the  attack,  for  after 
the  beginning  of  the  fire  action,  it  may  be  considered  that  there 
will  likely  be  no  additional  ammunition  through  the  day  or  at 
least  until  the  termination  of  the  action. 

For  the  defense,  it  is  usually  considered  that  they  have  all 
the  ammunition  they  can  possibly  use  or  that  there  are  means 
of  replenishing  ammuniton  during  the  engagement.  This  may 
not  be  the  fact,  as  the  defender  may  be  no  better  supplied  than 
the  attacker,  but  it  is  always  considered  that  as  the  attacker 
has  the  physical  fatigue  of  the  advance  and  is  consequently 
less  accurate  in  his  aiming  and  holding  while  the  defender  may 
have  the  advantage  of  using  a  rest  for  the  rifle,  the  attacker 
must  frequently  advance  fully  exposed  while  the  defender  re¬ 
mains  quiescent,  that  the  defender  may  have  availed  himself 
of  an  opportunity  for  determining  the  range  to  all  control  points 
in  the  direction  of  the  attack  so  as  to  be  able  to  announce  cor¬ 
rect  sight  settings  while  the  attacker  must  depend  upon  his  best 
estimates  followed  up  by  subtracting  his  estimates  of  the  dis¬ 
tance  advanced  from  that  estimate.  Hence  there  are  many  rea¬ 
sons  why  the  fire  of  the  defender  should  be  more  effective  man 
for  man  than  that  of  the  attacker  and  for  that  reason  less  am¬ 
munition  per  man  should  be  required  for  the  defense.  The 
psychology  of  the  situation  may  give  some  mathematical  ad¬ 
vantages. 

The  Major  may  not  announce  the  time  for  opening  fire  and 
the  advance  may  be  stopped  at  some  stage  and  be  unable  to 
continue  without  supporting  fire,  whereupon  it  will  become  the 
duty  of  the  ranking  officer  present  to  determine  whether  or  not 
fire  shall  be  opened.  The  following  points,  however,  should  be 
kept  in  mind: 

1.  Some  casualties  do  not  indicate  that  supporting  fire  is 
essential  to  further  advance. 

2.  The  first  shot  is  frequently  fired  by  a  nervous  recruit  and 
is  taken  up  all  along  the  line  unless  strenuous  efforts  are  exerted 
to  prevent  it. 

3.  The  beginning  of  fire  action  is  the  beginning  of  the  de¬ 
struction  of  control,  for  after  a  man  begins  to  fire,  he  looks  more 
to  himself  and  less  to  his  officer. 

4.  Do  not  let  your  men  “shoot  up  their  nerve”  or  “fan  the 
brush,”  both  are  admissions  of  cowardice  and  declarations  of 
your  inability  to  control  them. 

The  first  shot  may.  be  fired  by  an  old  soldier  who  has 
observed  an  excellent  target  and  cannot  control  his  desire  to 
take  advantage  of  it;  this  frequently  happens  where  a  force  is 
creeping  up  unseen  by  the  enemy  and  when  officers  and  non¬ 
commissioned  officers  are  not  w^atching  their  subordinates  as 
closely  as  they  watch  the  enemy.  This  is  a  tendency  wffiich  is 
found  in  all  troops,  and  is  counteracted  only  by  constant  w^atch- 
fulness  and  perfect  control  and  to  order  such  firing  stopped  and 
to  stop  it  is  insufficient,  the  man  who  caused  it  must  immediately, 
be  taken  to  account.  The  necessary  rebuke  is,  of  course,  public. 


7 


and  intended  not  only  for  the  correction  of  the  soldier  at  fault, 
but  for  the  prevention  of  line  “accidents,”  consequently  while 
the  language  used  may  be  most  caustic,  it  must  not  transgress 
that  unwritten  rule  which  prohibits  an  officer  from  taking 
advantage  of  his  position  for  the  abuse  of  one  under  him,  neither 
must  offensive  appellations  be  applied.  The  rebuke,  in  other 
words,  is  publicly  and  immediately  administered,  and  should 
leave  the  soldier  crestfallen  and  ashamed  but  should  not  stir  up 
f  resentment  either  in  him  or  in  those  who  hear  it,  and  should 

be  effective  notice  to  all  within  hearing  that  unauthorized  firing 
will  not  be  tolerated.  Such  things  make  or  break  discipline  and 
the  Lance  Corporal  is  as  competent  to  administer  such  a  rebuke 
as  the  Captain.  It  does  not  hurt  if  every  leader  from  the  Cor¬ 
poral  to  the  Captain  takes  advantage  of  the  occasion  to  assist 
in  the  ignominy  of  the  culprit. 

As  stated,  the  determination  of  the  time  for  opening  fire 
devolves  upon  the  Major  or  possibly  upon  the  Captain.  It  fol¬ 
lows  then  that  these  officers  should  be  well  versed  in  the  effective¬ 
ness  of  fire,  as  effected  by  range,  dispersion,  angle  of  fall  of  the 
trajectory  and  its  relation  to  the  slope  of  the  ground  at  or  near 
the  target.  A  study  of  combat  tactics  and  infantry  fire  as  given 
in  Drill  Regulations,  Field  Service  Regulations  and  the  Firing 
Manual  will  show  when  and  how  fire  may  be  opened  by  com¬ 
manders  junior  to  those  mentioned.  The  Major  follows  the 
firing  line  and  directs  its  operations  and  those  of  the  support  or 
fianking  groups;  without  his  orders,  each  Captain  directs  the 
operations  of  his  company  according  to  his  own  judgment  and 
preserving  his  general  relation  to  the  base.  Except  for  the  Major, 
the  firing  line  has  no  single  commander  who  exercises  super¬ 
vision  or  control  over  it.  The  base  company  is  not  a  perfect 
guide  nor  is  any  other  company  held  back  because  the  base  com¬ 
pany  cannot  or  does  not  advance  except  that  all  work  together 
in  harmony  and  giving  mutual  support  as  one  good  team. 

It  should  be  remembered  always  that  in  any  crisis  it  is  the 
military  senior  .  present  who  is  responsible,  and  he  has  full 
authority  while  he  is  senior.  I  hope  no  officer  or  noncom- 
j  missioned  officer  will  consider  my  statement  that  the  Major  is 

the  only  commander  of  the  firing  so  absolutely  that  he  will  forget 
the  provisions  of  the  Articles  of  War;  for,  as  stated,  the  princi¬ 
ples  of  Infantry  Tactics  may  suddenly  make  your  commander 
some  infantry  officer  you  have  never  seen  before,  whose  name 
you  do  not  know  and  may  never  know,  it  being  sufficient  for 
I  you  for  the  moment  that  he  has  rank  and  office  proper  to  such 

commands. 

So  much  for  the  duties  of  officers  and  noncommissioned  offi- 
^  cers.  Let  the  corporals  master  the  commands  and  signals  for 

the  maneuver  and  control  of  squads  and  the  detailed  technique 
^  of  squad  movements,  the  technique  of  handling  the  rifle  and  the 

rules  of  fire  discipline.  Let  the  Sergeant  and  Lieutenants  master 
those  things  and  the  management  of  platoons,  the  accurate 
description  of  targets,  the  estimation  of  distance  and  direction, 
the  study  of  topography  as  it  may  be  used  for  concealment,  for 
protection  and  as  it  affects  the  efficiency  of  fire,  the  distances  at 


8 


which  fire  is  effective  against  targets  of  varying  sizes,  the  aim¬ 
ing  points  for  moving  targets,  and  formations  which  are  least 
affected  by  fire  at  varying  ranges  and  varying  conditions  of 
terrain.  For  Captains  and  Majors  a  careful  study  of  Infantry 
Tactics,  Infantry  Fire  and  the  tactics  of  the  three  arms,  par¬ 
ticularly  that  of  the  Field  Artillery.  But  first  and  foremost  for 
officers  of  all  grades  is  the  study  of  the  drill  regulations  and 
thorough  mastery  of  its  provisions. 

The  Advance:  Troops  marching  into  battle  take  as  careful 
precautions  against  surprise  as  troops  marching  otherwise  where 
the  enemy  may  be  found,  but  while  troops  under  the  latter  con¬ 
dition  march  with  advance  guards,  rear  guards,  and  flank  guards, 
Infantry  marching  into  battle  gets  its  protection  either  from  its 
formation,  from  the  posting  and  marching  of  combat  patrols,  or 
from  both.  The  use  of  natural  cover  and  fire  support  are  also 
material  aids.  As  stated,  the  object  in  the  attack  is  to  advance 
without  ruinous  losses  to  ranges  within  which  effective  fire  can 
be  had  upon  the  enemy,  and  without  the  waste  of  ammunition  in 
arriving  at  such  distance. 

After  the  Major  has  published  his  orders  for  the  deploy¬ 
ment  of  the  battalion,  the  advance  guard  operations  cease;  it  is 
withdrawn,  and  each  company  marching  separately  in  the  gen¬ 
eral  direction  of  its  objective  must  look  after  the  protection  of 
its  own  march,  both  towards  the  front  and  towards  an  exposed 
flank.  It  is  not  to  be  considered  that  the  orders  of  the  Major  for 
deployment  contemplate  the  immediate  deployment  of  the  com¬ 
panies  into  line  of  skirmishers.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  may  be 
considered  that  the  occasion  indicates  only  that  the  time  has 
come  when  it  is  no  longer  advisable  for  the  battalion  to  advance 
as  such.  It  is  an  undenied  principle  of  infantry  tactics  that  the 
close  order  and  column  formations  be  retained  as  long  as  can  be 
v/ith  reasonable  safety.  Though  the  time  may  have  arrived  in 
which  the  battalion  can  no  longer  advance  in  column,  the  com¬ 
panies  may  still  advance  in  column.  When  the  company  can  no 
longer  advance  in  column  platoon  columns  should  still  be  able  to 
advance  and  after  them  squad  columns  and  column  formation 
should  be  retained  as  long  as  possible,  as  marching  in  line  and 
skirmish  line  unduly  fatigue  the  soldier,  who  must  be  saved  as 
much  as  possible  for  his  real  work.  The  rule  then  is  column  of 
some  kind  as  long  as  possible  and  whenever  possible  so  long  as  the 
fire  of  the  detachment  is  not  required  or  desired,  there  being  an  ex¬ 
ception  in  which  hostile  fire  is  more  effective  upon  a  column  than 
upon  a  line.  Your  firing  manual  or  any  good  work  upon  infantry 
fire  will  tell  you  what  that  condition  is,  and  as  you  will  always 
be  graded  upon  your  knowledge  of  the  use  of  fire  and  its  effects, 
I  prefer  that  you  find  it  for  yourselves  and  learn  the  reasons, 
for  in  searching  for  it  you  cannot  avoid  reading  some  very  inter¬ 
esting  and  important  facts.  The  company,  then,  marches  into 
battle  in  column  or  line  of  column,  always  toward  its  objective 
or  target,  but  not  necessarily  in  a  straight  line  toward  that 
target,  rather  necessarily  not  in  a  straight  line  toward  that 
target,  for  in  order  to  be  able  to  march  in  columns,  the  com¬ 
pany  must  take  adavantage  of  every  channel  of  concealment  to 


9 


.  avoid  exposure  to  fire.  Neither  does  any  company  attempt  to 
maintain  a  certain  interval  from  the  companies  adjacent  to  it; 

*  the  general  direction  must  be  preserved  and  the  ultimate  forma¬ 
tion  must  find  the  companies  at  their  proper  positions  in  the 
firing  line.  Conditions  of  topography,  however,  may  be  said  to 
govern  almost  absolutely  in  the  march  into  battle,  for  while  one 
company  may  be  unable  to  advance  without  exposure,  the  com¬ 
pany  next  to  it  in  the  line,  by  varying  its  course,  may  be  able 
to  continue  without  being  observed  and  consequently  without 
deploying  to  pass  over  open,  exposed  ground.  It  is  to  be  noted 
that  if  a  company  is  compelled  to  deploy  in  passing  over  open 
ground  and  may  again  advance  without  exposure,  it  takes  up  the 
column  or  formation  of  line  of  columns  most  convenient  and 
expeditious  as  soon  as  it  is  practicable  and,  while  one  may  be 
able  to  advance  steadily,  another  may  be  somewhat  delayed  by 
the  necessity  of  deployment  and  reassembly.  Changes  of  forma¬ 
tion  always  take  time,  but  reassembly  into  at  least  squad  column 
is  a  gain  of  time  in  marching.  Unless  the  Major  orders  other¬ 
wise,  one  company  will  not  wait  for  another  less  advanced 
provided  that  tactical  unity  of  the  battalion  is  not  lost  by  the 
advancement  or  delay  of  one  or  more  companies. 

The  infantry  fights  in  line  of  skirmishers  at  such  intervals 
as  the-  circumstances  require  or  permit;  it  also  advances  under 
direct  fire  of  infantry  in  such  formation,  under  indirect  fire 
from  artillery,  infantry  or  machine  guns;  it*  advances  in  such 
formation  as  minimizes  the  casualties.  This  rule  governs  the 
formation  of  and  distance  of  the  supports  and  reserves. 

I  cannot  add  to,  modify,  or  explain  the  rule  governing 
density  of  formation  of  firing  line  in  its  relation  to  preponderance 
or  superiority  of  fire.  The  rule  that  sufficient  rifles  must  be 
employed  to  gain  and  maintain  fire  superiority  is  absolute  and 
for  the  attacker  this  superiority  must  be  so  great  as  to  permit 
advance  of  parts  of  the  line.  Though  the  requirement  is  abso¬ 
lute,  the  method  of  securing  it  is  not.  For  the  defense,  tiers 
of  Are  may  be  utilized;  for  the  attacking  force.  Are  of  position 
covering  the  advance  of  the  infantry;  to  gain  the  density  of  fir¬ 
ing  line,  thin  lines  in  which  the  single  skirmishers  are  so  widely 
separated  as  to  furnish  no  material  target  may  have  to  be  util¬ 
ized.  The  Drill  Regulations  describe  the  advance  of  thin  lines 
for  the  avoidance  of  disastrous  casualties,  but  company  com¬ 
manders  must  be  extremely  careful  in  utilizing  this  method  of 
advance  that  the  troops  do  not  get  out  of  hand,  that  the  Lieuten¬ 
ants  and  sergeants  in  charge  of  the  various  lines  keep  excellent 
control  of  the  men  under  their  charge  and  lead  them  neither 
short  of  nor  beyond  the  desired  position  and  that  they  direct 
their  activities  in  the  best  manner  after  arrival  upon  the 
desired  new  line.  For  this  reason,  I  consider  that  the  First 
Lieutenant  is  the  best  officer  to  lead  the  first  line,  in  that  he  has 
or  should  have  the  greatest  professional  knowledge  and  exper¬ 
ience  in  the  control  of  men.  The  latter  qualification  is  perhaps 
the  greatest  in  this  tactical  situation  and,  wffiile  in  the  regular 
service  the  First  Lieutenant  or  the  First  Sergeant  would  usually 
best  fulfill  the  desired  qualifications,  it  does  not  necessarily  fol- 


low  that  such  would  be  the  case  in  a  National  Guard  or  Volun¬ 
teer  Company,  the  appointment  and  promotion  of  officers  and 
noncommissioned  officers  in  the  various  services  not  being  neces¬ 
sarily  governed  by  the  same  consideration. 

Suffice  it  to  say  that  wffiat  you  cannot  do  in  one  manner, 
you  may  accomplish  in  another,  and  whatever  your  method  of 
action,  you  must  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  to  succeed  you  must 
keep  your  men  under  control.  You  must  keep  them  always 
conscious  and  mindful  of  your  wishes  and  orders,  and  until  you 
take  your  men  into  action,  you  cannot  he  certain  of  the  dis¬ 
cipline  and  true  character  of  either  your  best  or  your  worst,  for 
until  your  men  have  had  a  taste  of  battle,  you  must  constantly 
work  against  the  fear  of  death,  which  discipline  and  fear  of  dig- 
grace  only  can  overcome  until  experience  in  battle  shows  the 
error  of  the  common  views  of  war. 

Rushes:  Conforming  to  the  opinions  of  Balck,  the  recorded 
experiences  of  Solaviev  and  statistics  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
our  Drill  Regulations  prescribe  30  to  80  yards  as  the  limit  of  a 
rush.  If  we  consider  the  time  necessary  to  fire  a  carefully 
aimed  shot  at  different  ranges,  the  temporary  surprise  of  the 
enemy  and  the  time  for  changing  target  from  a  fixed  to  a  mov¬ 
ing  one,  v/e  may  arrive  at  an  understanding  of  the  time  that  may 
be  allowed  for  a  rush  without  materially  increased  danger  from 
the  exposure.  Balck  (I,  83)  gives  five  seconds  as  necessary  to 
prepare  the  squad  for  a  rush  and  ten  to  fifteen  seconds  to  pre¬ 
pare  the  platoon  and  the  following  time  for  the  rush  to  cover: 
80  meters,  26-30  seconds,  40  meters,  17-20  seconds,  25  meters, 
10-15  seconds.  Consider  also  about  ten  seconds  after  the  rush 
before  aimed  fire  can  be  taken  up.  Three  platoon  rushes  of 
25  yards  each  will  cost  about  100  seconds  of  preparation  and 
exposure  without  returned  fire  against  some  47  seconds  for  a 
single  rush  covering  the  same  distance.  Von  Rohne  (Balck 
1,162)  gives  the  following  average  of  aimed  shots  per  minute 
for  trained  soldiers: 

Range  400  meters  or  less  5  rounds  per  minute. 

Range  400  to  700  meters  4-5  rounds  per  minute. 

Range  700  to  1,000  meters  3-4  rounds  per  minute. 

Range  1,000  to  1,300  meters  2-3  rounds  per  minute. 

Range  1,300  to  1,500  meters  1-4  rounds  per  minute. 

Range  over  1,500  meters  1  round  per  minute. 

Your  experience  on  the  target  range  has  dem^onstrated  that 
the  firing  of  the  first  shot  of  a  clip  of  series  takes  considerable 
more  time  than  subsequent  shots.  Continued  observations  of 
the  attaches  during  the  Russo-Japanese  War  and  their  recorded 
data  show  that  at  the  shorter  ranges,  preparation  for  a  rush 
by  subduing  the  enemies’  fire  took  greater  time  but  that  it  was 
possible  to  continue  the  rush  for  a  much  greater  length  than 
at  more  remote  ranges.  The  British  hold  that  it  pays  to  make 
a  long  rush  and  take  greater  casualties  on  account  of  the  diffi¬ 
culty  of  getting  a  rush  started.  Did  not  the  subject  of  battle 
psychology  dominate  the  subject,  I  would  say  unhesitatingly 


11 


that  the  length  of  rush  should  be  closely  related  to  the  time 
necessary  to  change  target  and  fire  an  average  aimed  shot  at 
the  range  and  that  therefore,  the  short  rush  would  be  prefer¬ 
able,  but  it  would  appear  that  the  only  safe  rule  is  to  study 
your  men,  study  your  ground,  study  the  enemies’  fire  and  rush 
as  far  as  you  safely  can  without  “winding”  your  men  or  subject¬ 
ing  them  to  disastrous  casualties. 

I  consider  it  excellent  practice  in  peace  preparation  to 
seek  out  the  small  hollows  and  humps  in  the  ground  to  the 
front;  teach  the  men  to  search  these  out  and  run  to  them  with¬ 
out  regard  to  the  exposure  in  running,  for  it  has  a  psychological 
value  in  that  the  soldier  having  fixed  his  intention  upon  rush¬ 
ing  to  a  particular  spot  once  started  for  it,  a  burst  of  fire  about 
him  will  likely  increase  his  speed  in  getting  to  the  pre¬ 
determined  place  rather  than  turn  him  back.  Troop  leaders  should 
remember  that  failing  to  advance  allows  the  men  to  believe 
that  they  cannot  advance,  hence  any  advance  so  that  there  be  an 
appearance  of  constancy  about  it  is  desirable,  to  avoid  the  belief 
by  the  men  that  they  are  but  holding  their  own  and  cannot  over¬ 
come  the  enemy,  for  if  this  state  of  mind  becomes  fixed  only  the 
addition  of  supporting  troops  will  likely  overcome  the  idea. 

The  term  “Superiority  of  Fire”  has  been  seriously  mis¬ 
understood.  It  refers  to  a  psychological  condition  rather  than 
to  either  a  preponderance  in  volume  of  fire  or  to  fire  which 
predominates  in  effectiveness,  and  the  correct  definition  of  the 
term  in  its  military  sense  would  be  that  fire  which  by  its 
effect  upon  the  minds  of  the  enemies’  soldiers  prevents  them 
from  using  their  own  arms  wdth,  reasonable  effectiveness,  in 
other  words,  that  fire  which  in  connection  with  other  incidents 
of  the  action  “gets  the  enemies’  goat”  so  thoroughly  that,  for 
the  moment,  a  tactical  advantage  over  him  is  or  may  be  had. 
For  example,  in  the  defense,  without  regard  to  the  amount  of 
fire  from  the  enemy,  if  the  defender  prevents  the  further  ad¬ 
vance  of  the  enemy  by  his  fire,  he  has  Fire  Superiority  whether 
the  fire  is  that  of  a  few  men  or  of  thousands  and  has  not 
necessarily  any  relation  in  fact  to  the  amount  of  ammunition 
or  casualties  of  the  one  party  or  of  the  other. 


ScHNEPP  &  Barnes,  State  Printers 
Springfield,  III. 

1915 


UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS-URBANA 


3  0112  098435016 


